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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 707

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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CONTENTS

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BELGIAN AID TO AFRICA REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French in 28 Nov 80 pp 3139, 3143

[Text] On 2 October 1980, the government of that time (Martens III) submitted its 1981 draft budget to Parliament for consideration.

Although since that date Belgium has chosen a new government (Martens IV), the political composition of which is totally different from the previous government, the enactment of the governmental declaration, approved on 29 October[1] which deals with the Ministry of Cooperation for Development and the appointment of the new minister (Mr Coens in place of Mr Eyskens, both of whom are from the same political family) are a good indication that the policy envisaged and the figures advanced on 2 October will be maintained. Once again, at this stage, we only have overall figures (taken from parliamentary documents).

Belgian Aid for Development by Major Categories (in millions of Belgian francs)

	1980 Initial	1980 Adjusted	1981
Ministry of Finance	6,765.7	6,272.8	4,323.1
National Defense	468.5	468.4	508.7
National Education	166.5	166.5	229.3
Foreign Affairs	186.5	186.5	193.6
EEC	2,300	1,312	1,612
Cooperation for development			
Current expenditures	7,447.3	6,983.5	7,264.1
Capital expenditures	5,752.6	4,982.6	5,281.6
National lottery	1,760	1,760	1,800
Total	24,847.1	22,132.3	21,212.4
Estimation of GNP (billions of Belgian francs)	3,583.4	3,500	3,760
Percentage of aid vis-a-vis the GNP	0.69	0.63	0.56

The 21,212.4 million Belgian francs represent the lump sum for development aid (on this subject see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDTERRANEENS dated 20 June 1980, p 1548); for its part, the budget proper of the Ministry of Cooperation totals 14,345.7 million.

The budgetary decisions of the governmental declaration (Martens III) caused the government to draw up the 1981 budget within very strict limitations (which probably will be maintained by the Martens IV government). This situation represents overall an appreciable decrease compared to the initial adjusted 1980 estimates. This situation is exceptional to the extent that it results from the seriousness of the state of public finances.

Budgetary allocations for the Ministry of Cooperation for Development have had the following evolution (1981 compared to 1980 adjusted); current expenditures, plus 4.02 percent; capital expenditures, plus 6 percent.

The growth of the 1981 allocations compared to the adjusted 1980 budget must be evaluated in light of the reductions applied in 1980 and carried over to the adjustment feuilleton for this year (see 1980 budget below). The budgetary ceilings established will lead cooperation ministry officials to reexamine the programming of projects and, if necessary, to propose to the government measures which will assure adherence to the budgetary allocations.

With a view in partic lar to giving the Ministry of Cooperation for Development the instruments which will make possible the ministry's optimum utilization of its financial resources and will insure greater effectiveness in their usage, the government will shortly be presented with draft legislation calling for the establishment of a Cooperation for Development Fund. The establishment of this Fund figures among the major objectives of the government's accord relating to public aid for development.[2]

The 1980 Budget

On 20 June 1980 we wrote: "It should be noted that all figures cited must be taken with certain reservations, as the government has decided, within the framework of its austerity policy, to impose upon all ministries a reduction of 2.2 percent on expenditures which appear in their budgetary proposals. The particular budget of the cooperation ministry, moreover, has not yet been submitted to the Chambers."

At present, this law has not yet been approved. All of the ministerial departments are still working under the system of provisional allocations which are regularly approved by Parliament.

However, the Foreign Affairs Committee on 10 July 1980 submitted the report it had prepared on the subject of allocations pertaining to the Ministry of Cooperation for Development.[3] Since this document lists a whole series of conditions which are to govern the operation of the AGCD (General Administration for the Ministry of Cooperation for Development), we feel that it would be of interest to publish some of the principal conditions.

1. Budgetary Reductions. A). These reductions total 1,234 million Belgian francs distributed as follows: current expenditures, 464 million; capital expenditures, 770 million (these include in particular the 2.2 percent reduction to which reference was made in the preceding article).

B) These budgetary reductions will have no impact upon projects initiated by ONGs (nongovernmental organizations).

2. Staffing. In June 1980, the personnel staffing of the AGCD was broken down as follows: AGCD personnel residing in Belgian, 441; overseas cooperation personnel, 3,109.

3. Belgium maintains cooperation relations, in various forms, with 95 Third World countries.[4]

An important fact: there are only 30 countries to which aid of over 20 million Belgian francs is granted. Heading this group are (based on the 1978 budget): Zaire, 3,245.3 million; Rwanda, 1,081.3 million; and Burundi, 656 million. They are followed by 13 countries receiving aid of 10 million to 20 million; 13 countries receiving aid of 5 million to 10 million; 13 countries receiving aid of 2 million to 5 million; and 26 countries receiving aid of less than 2 million.

Only the first 20 countries, which absorb about 88 percent of the AGCD's bilateral contributions, are benefiting from three forms of direct intervention: personnel, projects and scholarships. At the head of the list, after the three countries already named, are Morocco, Tunisia, Indonesia, Senegal, the Ivory Coast and Niger.

Zaire. Belgian participation in the "Mobutu Plan" for 1980 can be evaluated at 1,260 million Belgian francs. An allocation of 88 million figures in the budget for the agricultural sector. If we take into account the private action of the ONGs, we can say that rural development represents about 32 percent of overall Belgian aid to Zaire.

Rwanda and Burundi. For 1980, programs involving respectively 1,200 million and 800 million Belgian francs have been prepared for these two countries. Here, too, the programs are oriented toward agricultural projects and rural development.

4. Apart from Africa, Belgian cooperation will involve most particularly countries in Southeast Asia and Latin America.

In Belgium's negotiations with the countries it aids, the accent is being placed increasingly upon agricultural development and rural development in general.

Final comment. Budgetary questions were brought up again during the debate on the investiture of the Martens IV government in the Chamber of Representatives. The 1981 budget, which has been prepared but not approved, should, it seems, be reexamined (the majority and opposition appear to share this viewpoint).

Although that, in the cooperation sector, could bring about changes in figures, there is little chance that it will bring about alterations in Belgium's principal policy lines in this sector.

FOOTNOTES

1. Extract from the governmental statement: "Our country will attempt to improve relations between industrialized and developing countries, particularly through the pact for unified growth. Temporary difficulties should not be obstacles to the pursuit of dialog between the north and the south... In collaboration with our European partners, our action should offer the Third World the prospect of more equitable and better balanced relations in the spirit of solidarity and human dignity."

2. Extract from the statement by Minister Eyskens on this subject: "The two communities (the French-speaking and Dutch-speaking communities resulting from the new structures adopted by the Belgian state) will be associated in cooperation for development. A Cooperation for Development Fund will be established. Collaboration between the minister of cooperation and the communities will take place within the directive organizations of the fund." N.B. The text of the law to which he makes reference was to have been the Council of State before the parliamentary recess. The avatars of Belgian policy decided otherwise.

3. This text was not disseminated until the return of parliament.

4. This dispersion is the subject of criticisms and numerous interrogations.

8143
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UEBL TRADE WITH AFRICA DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 pp 3140-3143

[Article by Pierre Platon]

[Text] UEBL (Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union) trade with the world in 1979 totaled 3,417.62 billion Belgian francs compared to 2,936.3 billion in 1978. Such trade is broken down as follows:

	Import	Export
1979	1,769.49	1,648.13
1978	1,526.04	1,410.26

The 16.4 percent increase in terms of current francs, a rate higher than that of the monetary devaluation brought on by inflation, bears witness to a relatively moderate development of operations. The vast majority of these operations have been carried on with Europe and most particularly with the EEC partners:

Percentage of Total Trade

	Imports		Exports	
	1979	1978	1979	1978
Trade with Europe	75.51	76.81	83.39	81.20
Including the EEC	76.25	69.05	61.22	71.55

It will be noted in table UEBL-AF-B that the 4 principal suppliers and the 5 principal customers in 1979 of Belgium and Luxembourg were European: FRG, France, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Italy.

Switzerland was the European partner not a member of the EEC which had the greatest turnover with the UEBL, clearly ahead of Sweden or Spain.

In 1979, the appreciable slowdown in imports from Europe and the sizable increase in sales to Europe permitted the UEBL to have a slight surplus in the balance of trade (102.86 percent coverage compared to only 97.70 percent in 1978).

UEBL-AF-A Breakdown of Foreign Trade of the UEBL (billions of current Belgian francs)

	Imports		Exports	
	1979	1978	1979	1978
Total	1,769.49	1,526.04	1,648.13	1,410.26
Europe	1,336.10	1,172.10	1,374.38	1,145.11
Africa	83.79	60.[illegible]	65.43	60.11
America	165.97	127.40	90	82.80
Asia	173.61	157.37	103.93	106.69
Oceania	8.83	7.45	4.24	4.62
Miscellaneous	1.19	1.01	10.15	10.93

UEBL-AF-B The Twenty Leading World Suppliers and Customers of the UEBL in 1979 (millions of Belgian francs)

Suppliers		Customers	
FRG	350,757.1	FRG	321,946.2
The Netherlands	249,998.4	France	268,428.1
France	249,721.9	The Netherlands	231,811.7
Great Britain	127,829.1	Great Britain	101,709.6
U.S.A.	116,854.7	Italy	64,526.9
Italy	61,201.5	U.S.A.	61,656.5
Saudi Arabia	58,919.6	Switzerland	47,027.7
Switzerland	35,248.6	Sweden	28,213.8
Japan	29,762.5	Denmark	16,568.3
Zaire	28,072	Canary Islands	14,620.5
Sweden	27,050.5	Saudi Arabia	14,223.1
USSR	17,368.6	Spain	13,961.7
Nigeria	15,472	USSR	13,696.7
Spain	15,171.4	Norway	13,209.4
Canada	14,238.5	Austria	12,750.7
Norway	13,622.6	India	11,504.7
South Africa	12,884.7	Hong Kong	10,865.4
Iran	11,310.1	Nigeria	10,290.7
Iraq	10,648.4	Japan	10,106.7
Gulf Emirates	8,770.8	Iraq	8,401.8

UEBL trade with continents other than Europe, compared to total imports or exports, is represented by the following percentages:

	Imports		Exports	
	1979	1978	1979	1978
America	9.38	8.35	5.46	5.87
Asia	9.81	10.31	6.31	7.57
Africa	4.74	3.98	3.97	4.26
Oceania and miscellaneous	0.57	0.49	0.87	1.10

The American continent is basically represented by the United States (fifth leading supplier and sixth leading customer of the UEBL). We observe, however, a very important trade imbalance to the detriment of the UEBL (export/import coverage with America: 54.23 percent in 1979, 64.99 percent in 1978).

UEBL trade with Asia is also imbalanced because the big suppliers of oil, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq or the Emirates, do not very adequately offset their sales by purchases of Belgian-Luxembourg products. There is, moreover, the phenomenon of Japan, the trade with which in 1978 and 1979 is reflected below (in millions of Belgian francs):

	Imports from Japan	Exports to Japan	Coverage by UEBL
1978	29,762.52	10,106.75	33.96 percent
1979	25,268.11	8,875.87	35.13 percent

UEBL trade with Africa is characterized by its insignificance: less than 5 percent of total imports, less than 4 percent of total sales. It is strange and distressing to note that the commercial transactions effected in 1979 between the UEBL and the FRG alone were 4-1/2 times greater than total purchases and sales the same year between the Union and the 57 African states figuring in the statistics, including South Africa.

A more careful examination permits the realization that the UEBL really trades appreciably with only a half dozen African countries, including Zaire, an important mining state in which Belgium has had and continues to have very large interests; South Africa, which has strategic or precious products; and several suppliers of oil or iron ore.

In the suppliers' sector, we will observe that in 1979 purchases from 3 countries (Zaire, Nigeria and South Africa) represent 67.3 percent of the UEBL's total African purchases. Sales are somewhat less clustered; however, the leading customers listed, Algeria, Nigeria, Zaire, South Africa, Morocco and Egypt receive 67.4 percent of total shipments from the UEBL.

The classification of commercial operations effected in 1979 between the UEBL and Africa is reflected in table UEBL-AF-C (in francs). Commercial operations are broken down on the basis of sections of the Nomenclature of Brussels [NDB].

UEBL-AF-C Classification of UEBL's African Imports and Exports by Merchandise Category (1979) (millions of Belgian francs)

	Imports	Exports
Live animals and animal products	230.70	3,202.92
Vegetable products (food in general)	3,646.49	4,119.84
Animal or vegetable fats or oils	308.55	244.18
Products from food, beverage and tobacco industries	2,543.58	3,988.43
Unprocessed mineral products (including oil products	31,659.90	6,469.20
Products from chemical and associated industries	355.79	5,453.91
Plastic and rubber materials	63.32	2,863.31
Hides, leathers and products of these materials	68.72	105.16
Lumber, cork and products of these materials	1,483.14	333
Printed and unprinted papers	39.26	710.32
Textile materials and products	3,138.22	3,876.30
Footweat, headwear, umbrellas, fans, etc	71.82	58.87
Products of stone, plaster, cement, ceramics, asbestos, glass	21.92	648.27
Gemstones, precious metals, coins	8,111.50	695.07
Common metals and products	18,697.10	10,571.97
Nonelectric or electric machines and appliances	233.48	12,296.44
Transportation equipment	836.39	3,543.83
Optics, timepieces, gauges, precision and sound instruments	54.11	750.98
Arms and ammunition	1.32	18.64
Miscellaneous merchandise and products not mentioned elsewhere: furniture, bedding, brushes, toys, etc	12.27	256.43
Objects d'art and collectibles	3.79	0.48
Confidential (or undetermined) trade	12,261.40	5,246.84
Total	83,788.87	65,434.39

Imports from Africa

African imports involve most particularly three major categories (amounts in millions of Belgian francs and percentages of total imports):

1.	Unprocessed mineral products, including petroleum products:	31,659.90	(37.8 percent)
2.	Common metals and products:	18,697.10	(22.3 percent)
3.	Gemstones and precious metals:	8,111.50	(9.7 percent)

(However, we note 12.2 billion (14.6 percent) in "confidential trade" the nature of which escapes us and involves principally Zaire: 12,140 million.)

The other appreciable groups of imported products are: vegetable products (in general food), 3,646 million; textile materials and products derived from them, 3,138.2 million; and products from food, beverage and tobacco industries, 2,543.6 million.

Among the unprocessed mineral products purchased from Africa, we find energy products at the top of the list: hydrocarbons, coal or coke (24,851 million Belgian francs). The principal suppliers of oil: Nigeria: 3,189,928 tons; Libya: 550,265 tons; Algeria: 522,588 tons; Angola: 110,127 tons; Cameroon: 99,756 tons; Gabon: 94,621 tons; etc. Suppliers of coal: South Africa: 1,913,684 tons; Zaire: 18,287 tons.

Next come the metallic ores (4,578 million). Iron ore from Liberia: 1,855,412 tons; from Mauritania: 1,143,769 tons; from Algeria: 837,231 tons; South Africa: 418,087 tons; manganese ore from South Africa: 218,809 tons; from Gabon, via the Congo: 108,533 tons; from Ghana: 39,977 tons; miscellaneous ores (lead, zinc, tin, copper, etc): 51,643 tons, from Zaire, Morocco, etc.

UEBL African purchases under Chapter 25 of the NDB totaled 2,232 million Belgian francs and involved principally phosphates: Morocco: 1,320,312 tons; Togo: 216,754 tons; Tunisia: 51,382 tons. It should be noted that 4,352 tons of ceramic clay (terre de chamotte) were imported from Mozambique.

Imports of common metals and products (Section XV) theoretically cover 11 statistical chapters; however, purchases are limited to a handful of specific metals (copper, iron, nickel, aluminum and manganese); and suppliers are quite few in number. Some 96.4 percent of the purchases in terms of francs involve copper: 261,798 tons (13,628 million) from Zaire; 31,532 tons (1,821 million) from South Africa; 27,632 tons (1,529 million) from Zambia; and 957 tons from miscellaneous sources.

Iron products come from Egypt in the form of sheets (5,920 tons) or from South Africa in different forms (shaped pieces, bars, sheets, etc) but principally in alloys (ferrochromium, ferromanganese, ferrosilicon). Of the 14,140 tons of iron products from South Africa, iron alloys represented 9,359 tons.

Chromium comes exclusively from South Africa (912 tons; 160 million).

Imports of aluminum or products of this metal did not total 80 million Belgian francs and involved principally Ghana (3,966 tons) and Egypt (1,160 tons).

Purchases of precious metals, gemstones, jewelry or coins were made principally in the following countries (in millions of Belgian francs): South Africa, diamonds only (4,781); Central Africa (681); Congo (646); Sierra Leone (619); Liberia (576); Zaire (560); Burundi (387.5); Tanzania (217); Tunisia (103); Mairitius (84.5); and Ghana (44).

Once the imports involving the three major categories of products which have just been described and the 12.2 billion in "confidential" purchases have been deducted, only 13,059 million remain, broken down as follows (millions of Belgian francs):

Vegetable products	3,646.5
Textile materials and products	3,138
Food industry products	2,543.5
Lumber, cork and products	1,483
Transportation equipment	836.5
Chemical products	356
Miscellaneous	1,055.5

The reader will note that exotic products, formerly "colonial products," which in principle represent the key item of European purchases, have been reduced by the UEBL to a congruous part of total imports: 8-9 percent. The largest imports involved fruits (1,383 million Belgian francs) from South Africa: 47,875 tons, including 17,341 tons of citrus fruits and 30,534 tons of apples, pears and grapes; from Morocco: 19,900 tons of citrus fruits; and from miscellaneous countries, particularly the Ivory Coast (4,568 tons) and Swaziland (1,330 tons).

Coffee, tea and spices were represented by only 1,175 million Belgian francs worth of purchases. We note 2 important suppliers of coffee: Zaire (4,772 tons, 416 million Belgian francs), Kenya (1,762 tons), Cameroon (1,311 tons), Ethiopia (812 tons), Burundi (466 tons), Uganda (186 tons). Pepper, cloves, nutmeg, etc come from Madagascar, Rwanda, Tanzania, etc.

Imports of cacao, or cacao products, are small (822 million Belgian francs). In fact, we find only 6 suppliers: Ivory Coast (4,431 tons), Nigeria (1,265 tons), Zaire (1,015 tons), Ghana (682 tons), Togo (321 tons) and Sao Tome (50 tons).

Cereals imported from Tanzania (90,976 tons), the Sudan (6,128 tons) and Morocco (2,852 tons) for a total of 477 million Belgian francs consisted mainly of sorghum.

A total of 45,500 tons of vegetables (potatoes, carrots, green vegetables, dry or fresh) amounting to 414 million Belgian francs came from Tanzania (34,739 tons), Morocco (3,133 tons), Ethiopia (2,923 tons), Canary Islands (1,793 tons), Kenya (1,512 tons) and Egypt (332 tons).

Vegetable oils (308 million) were purchased principally from South Africa (7,941 tons), the Ivory Coast (2,271 tons), Nigeria (797 tons) and Senegal (574 tons).

We note 163 million Belgian francs worth of imports of pharmaceutical plants or quinine bark. The principal suppliers were Zaire, Kenya, Cameroon, Rwanda and Burundi.

Some sugar-producing countries sold molasses to the UEBL for a total of 221 million Belgian francs. These were Mauritius (16,161 tons), Madagascar (15,209 tons), Egypt (8,022 tons), Morocco (7,971 tons), Sudan (5,952 tons), Ethiopia (5,662 tons). The UEBL also purchased milling products, fishmeal or oilcake for animal feed (641 million Belgian francs). Suppliers: Nigeria (60,390 tons), Sudan (4,558 tons), Zaire (2,718 tons), Morocco (1,831 tons), Egypt (1,463 tons), etc.

Wines from North Africa entered the UEBL for a total of 111 million Belgian francs from Tunisia (61,900 hectaliters), Algeria (12,300 hectaliters) and Morocco (1,030 hectaliters).

We find 5 or 6 sizable suppliers of unprocessed or processed tobacco (293 million Belgian francs total): South Africa (1,892 tons), Malawi (680 tons), Mozambique (385 tons), Tanzania (314 tons), Zambia (87 tons) and Madagascar (56 tons).

In the textile sector, purchases of raw materials by the UEBL from Africa principally involved cotton, wool and sisal.

Unprocessed cotton and cotton products represent 1,246 million Belgian francs worth of purchases. Suppliers of unprocessed cotton were chiefly Nigeria (4,901 tons), Egypt (2,635 tons), Chad (1,784 tons), Sudan (1,075 tons), Cameroon (504 tons), Mali (400 tons), South Africa (97 tons), Upper Volta, Togo, etc. Tunisia sold 2,228 tons of fabrics (286 million Belgian francs), the Ivory Coast 307 tons and South Africa 100 tons. Thread came chiefly from Egypt (2,207 tons), the Ivory Coast (358 tons) and South Africa (336 tons).

Wool was imported solely from South Africa (1,506 tons; 163 million) and Kenya (89 tons: 4.6 million).

Sisal and products of this fiber were purchased from the following countries: Tanzania, 5,073 tons of fiber and 6,979 tons of products; Madagascar, 1,124 tons of fiber; Kenya, 541 tons of fiber and 605 tons of products; Mozambique, 410 tons of fiber and 770 tons of products. We note the purchase of 4,887 tons (167.5 million Belgian francs) of flax or ramie from Ethiopia.

(1) UEBL-AF-1 UEBL Foreign Trade (1979)



Key:

(2) (billions of Belgian francs)

(3) Africa
(4) America
(5) Asia
(6) Others
(7) Others
(8) Asia
(9) America
(10) Africa

(11) Principal African suppliers

(12) South Africa
(13) Others
(14) Algeria
(15) Morocco
(16) Libya

(17) Principal African customers
(18) Others
(19) Algeria
(20) South Africa
(21) Morocco
(22) Egypt
(23) Libya

UEBL-AF-D The Twenty Leading African Suppliers of the UEBL (millions of Belgian francs)

	1979	1978	1977
Zaire	28,072.8	24,134.3	22,684.8
Nigeria	15,472	7,218.8	6,470.8
South Africa	12,854.7	10,394.7	10,584.7
Algeria	3,947.2	2,282.1	3,533.4
Morocco	3,076	2,827.3	3,312.2
Libya	2,859.6	366.8	678.5
Liberia	2,223.3	1,885.3	985
Tunisia	1,642.1	1,270.5	1,324.6
Zambia	1,640.3	782.2	1,744.4
Cameroon	1,523.3	855.7	783.9
Ivory Coast	1,511.7	1,157.4	1,197.9
Tanzania	974.5	416.2	568.1
Congo	945.2	286.2	242.6
Egypt	923.9	1,562.8	1,537
Mauritania	721.9	345	785.3
Central African Republic	681.3	769	397.7
Sierra Leone	633.8	184.7	23.3
Gabon	584.2	37.2	246.6
Burundi	529	526.9	239.7
Angola	497.7	196.8	111.1

Ready-made textile products (1,283 million Belgian francs) come principally from 3 African countries: Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritius (in tons; Belgian francs in parentheses):

	Headwear	Clothing	Other Articles
Tunisia	143 (99.3)	1,990 (785.4)	76 (64.4)
Morocco	--	225 (91.6)	--
Mauritius	211 (116)	81 (50)	--

In the lumber sector, we note 3 large suppliers and 4 medium-size or small suppliers for a total of 1,770 million Belgian francs:

	Tons	Millions of Belgian francs
Cameroon	60,450	610.8
Ivory Coast	40,168	413.4
Liberia	14,746	114.1
Zaire	8,484	108.5
Congo	7,999	96.1
Gabon	6,103	65.9
South Africa	3,347	55.3
Ghana	726	5
Mozambique	295	4.8
Nigeria	136	1.7
etc		

Raw rubber was purchased principally from Zaire (551 tons), Cameroon (381 tons), Liberia (140 tons), South Africa (123 tons) and the Ivory Coast (37 tons).

Manufactured chemical products are not imported from Africa by the UEBL to any great extent. With the exception, however, of the derivatives of natural phosphates: anhydride or phosphoric acid from South Africa (17,569 tons), phosphates from Morocco (2,697 tons) or phosphate fertilizers from Morocco (12,463 tons) or Tunisia (5,294 tons).

It is pointless to dwell on processed products imported by the UEBL from Africa other than food or textile products. Most often these other products are in the machinery or equipment sectors (233.5 million Belgian francs) or transportation equipment (836.5 million) of sending back secondhand equipment to the country of origin.

Exports to Africa

The examination of exports from the UEBL to Africa will be less detailed than that of the African imports of these two states. These exports are fairly well distributed and although 2 categories of goods hold a particular position, machinery and common metal products, they cover only one-third (35 percent) of total sales in terms of francs (see table UEBL-AF-E). Because of the small importance to the Union of automobile, naval or aeronautical construction, we should not be surprised by the position--only 10th position--of sales of transportation equipment.

We present below (in millions of Belgian francs) the four to five best African customers of the UEBL for each of the NDB sections:

1. Live Animals and Animal Products: 3,202.9 million Belgian francs: Egypt (1,284.8), Zaire (358.5), Morocco (167.2), Libya (135.7), Sudan (128.1), etc. Exports involve principally dairy products.

2. Vegetable Products: 4,120 million Belgian francs: Algeria (1,006.4), Morocco (908.3), Egypt (636.5), Nigeria (246.3), Tunisia (203.4), Zaire (210.7).

3. Animal or Vegetable Fats or Oils: 244.2 million Belgian francs: Nigeria (128.5), Morocco (28.1), Canary Islands (26.5).

4. Products from Food, Beverage and Tobacco Industries: 3,988.5 million Belgian francs: Nigeria (1,199), Algeria (955.6), Ghana (349.6), Zaire (228.1), Sudan (191.8).

5. Mineral Products, including Hydrocarbons: 6,469.2 million Belgian francs: Nigeria (5,059.6), Libya (391), Canary Islands (198).

6. Products from Chemical and Associated Industries: 5,453.9 million Belgian francs: South Africa (1,478.2), Zaire (676.1), Nigeria (674.4), Algeria (577.9), Morocco (338.4), Egypt (193.7).

7. Plastic and Rubber Products: 2,863.3 million Belgian francs: Algeria (635), South Africa (446.3), Nigeria (298.5), Egypt (297).

8. Leathers and Hides and Leather Products: 105.2 million Belgian francs: Algeria (43.7), Tunisia (27.7).

9. Lumber and Wood Products: 333 million Belgian francs: Algeria (229.5), Morocco (16.4).

10. Paper and Boxes: 710.3 million Belgian francs: Zaire (207.5), Algeria (166.6), Nigeria (77.8).

11. Textiles and Textile Products: 3,876.3 million Belgian francs: Algeria (668.8), Tunisia (635), Morocco (547.3), Zaire (442.9), South Africa (394.3), Egypt (246.6).

12. Footwear, Headwear and Clothing Accessories: 58.9 million Belgian francs: Ghana (23.4), Zaire (18.6).

13. Products of Stone, Ceramics, Plaster, Cement, etc.: 648.3 million Belgian francs: Algeria (214), Nigeria (62.8), Zaire (47.4), Morocco (43.3).

14. Pearls, Gemstones, Jewelry, Coins: 695.1 million Belgian francs: Tanzania (181.8), South Africa (159), Egypt (101.8).

15. Common Metals and Products: 10,572 million Belgian francs: Algeria (4,937.1), Nigeria (793.3), Zaire (709.7), Egypt (492.2), Morocco (453.9), Sudan (366), South Africa (318.3), Ivory Coast (299.1), Angola (232.8).

16. Electric or Nonelectric Machines and Appliances: 12,296.4 million Belgian francs: Algeria (3,567), Zaire (1,488.9), South Africa (1,426.6), Nigeria (1,209.9), Ivory Coast (815.1), Egypt (711.3), Morocco (323).

17. Transportation Equipment: 3,543.8 million Belgian francs: Algeria (956.9), Zaire (721.5), Nigeria (331.7), Angola (228.4).

18. Optical, Measurement, Precision Instruments: 731 million Belgian francs: Zaire (174.7), Algeria (146), South Africa (69.7), Tunisia (47.5).

19. Arms and Ammunition: 18.6 million Belgian francs: Libya (7.7).

20. Furniture, Brushes, Toys, Miscellaneous: 256.4 million Belgian francs: Zaire (54.1), Tunisia (25).

21. Objects d'Art: 0.48 million Belgian francs.

22. Confidential Trade: 5,160.3 million Belgian francs: Libya (1,874.8), Morocco (944.7), Liberia (577), South Africa (287), Algeria (280.5), Mauritania (257.4).

UEBL-AF-E The Twenty Leading African Customers of the UEBL (millions of Belgian francs)

	1979	1978	1977
Algeria	14,620.3	12,825.4	10,286.4
Nigeria	10,290.7	9,263.2	8,405.3
Zaire	5,633.8	5,606.2	6,467.5
South Africa	5,037	4,578.2	4,808.6
Morocco	4,274.8	3,290.1	4,410.3
Egypt	4,254	2,775.9	2,537.9
Libya	3,793	4,235.3	8,253.4
Tunisia	2,075.8	205.4	83.7
Ivory Coast	1,672.3	1,865.5	1,060.7
Sudan	1,066.9	631.8	1,121.4
Kenya	934.2	953.5	594.2
Liberia	924.9	422.5	718.6
Tanzania	904.3	923.9	1,029.7
Angola	904	1,212.5	838.3
Rwanda	676.7	844.8	618.6
Ghana	668.3	432.3	568.4
Senegal	651.6	478.2	629.9
Cameroon	651.2	774.5	620.4
Canary Islands	630.9	438.9	617.2
Burundi	542.3	412.5	362.2

8143
CSO: 4400

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

POSSIBLE LIBYAN INTERFERENCE IN SENEGAL--The French Government recently decided to grant 550 million additional francs to the Senegalese Government. France's hope: to stem the agitation organized by Shaykh Moustapha Niasse, who is close to Qadhdhafi, which is developing in the regions most affected by the drought. [Excerpt] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 29 Dec 80 p 10]

SENEGAL, GAMBIA SPLIT WITH LIBYA--Ahmed Khalifa Niasse is considered to be at the origin of the departure of President Senghor who reportedly feared an Islamic coup d'etat supported by Libya. The not very modest "Ayatollah of Kaolack," who is encountering unanimous opposition against himself in Senegal and found shelter in Tripoli in February, played a decisive role in the rupture of diplomatic relations between Senegal and Libya in June. And undoubtedly also between the Gambia and Libya in November. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Dec 80 p 51]

NIGERIAN-CAMEROONIAN BORDER TRAFFIC--According to the national daily CAMEROON TRIBUNE, the traffic of automobiles between Nigeria and Cameroon is a "well-organized and flourishing" enterprise. During the visit of the three Cameroonian ministers in charge of fraud control to the northwest border of the country, the newspaper, quoting customs officials, explained how the traffic operates. In Cameroon, the traffickers purchase a second-hand car with Cameroonian license plates. Upon its subsequent arrival in Nigeria, new papers are obtained showing that this is a "new" vehicle. Finally, with the complicity of some customs officers, the car is imported "as new" and tax-free into Cameroon. Radios, cassettes, watches, cigarettes, textiles and even banknotes are carried by men on border trails, and introduced by tradesmen into Nigeria; they are then exchanged on the black market, the Yaounde daily also reports. Let us recall that the Nigerian currency, the naira, has a low rate of exchange with respect to the CAF franc, even through the official rate is about 390 CFA francs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 12 Dec 80 p 3415] 9294

NIGER-NIGERIA COOPERATION--A communique published in Lagos on 12 December, at the end of the 12th session of the Joint Nigerien-Nigerian Commission, states that the two countries are pleased with the progress achieved until now in the realization of joint projects. Among these projects are a study on the industrial growing of sorgho in the two countries, the exploitation of their joint water resources, and the installation of a telecommunications network between Maradi (Niger) and Katsina (Nigeria). Both parties also stressed the need to further reinforce their cooperation in all domains. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 19 Dec 80 p 3483] 9294

CSO: 4400

BENIN

KEREKOU VISITS, INVESTIGATES PRODUCTION UNITS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3093

/Text/ After the visits to the provinces made by the political commissions, President Kerekou visited some production units. The information that reaches him regarding these companies mentions poor administration, malpractices of all kinds (corruption, embezzlement, thefts, and so on), incompetence, and dishonesty. An illustration of all these faults was presented to the Council of Ministers on 8 October.

According to the Council's communique, "the head of state made the permanent committee of the national executive council aware of the results of the investigation and verification mission which he sent to the directorate general of the National Agricultural Credit Bank."

An examination of these results reveals that large amounts of money were granted by the bank to local collectivities and public enterprises, both national and provincial. To date the situation with regard to nonreimbursed credits among collectivities and public companies reveals unpaid funds of more than 2 billion CFA francs; that is, approximately 420 million for the six provinces, approximately 170 million for 16 of the 84 districts in the country, approximately 180 million for the six Centers of Regional Activity for Rural Development, and the rest for the national and provincial companies.

When it is known that this situation is not isolated, it can be understood why the head of state of Benin decided to obtain on-the-spot information from the administrators in charge.

These verifications were various and fruitful. Indeed, in certain companies he established that the political leaders themselves are organizing the pilfering; this was the case with the National Paper and Book Company. In other cases, connivance between the management and the political leaders ruins any effective action by the production unit.

But in general these companies are not successful: service companies are not managing to pay their employees. No one can explain insolvencies of companies such as the Beninese Palm Oil Company, which do not honor their commitments to their employees or to their clients.

There are numerous reasons for this situation. We have given some of them. Others can be brought to light: the large number of units, which makes for overlapping areas of responsibility; the mandarinat (competitive system of examinations for administrative posts) seen within certain units; the leaders of certain companies who, because of their regional or political affiliation or their personal family ties, have become sacrosanct even if faults are reported in their administration.

Col Matthieu Kerekou is not even hiding this, since in Abomey, at the National Company for Agriculture, and in Porto-Novo at the Beninese Palm Oil Company, he denounced these aristocratic, feudal, and bourgeois revolutionaries that constitute his entourage and who get their friends and relatives appointed to positions where competence and honesty alone should be the criteria for selection. It must be said that the good-natured way that the president of the Republic conducts his tours does not seem to unduly disturb those whom he taxes with dishonesty and unloyal acts toward him.

In fact, his visits always start with a series of accusations and reproaches, and end kindly, for the "great comrade of struggle" succeeds in understanding the situation and, as was said by one participant in the meeting at the National Fruits and Vegeatables Company, which was blamed for owing the National Agricultural Credit Bank 500 million, he ends by "putting water in his wine."

This comfortable, family-like atmosphere that President Kerekou creates during his visits does not permit one to measure the true significance of his act. One must believe, however, that he is aware of the stakes. In fact, the companies in Benin need surgical aid: regrouping is necessary, cancellations are indispensable. At the human level, political and regional elements alone can no longer be the sole criteria of choice. Since President Kerekou's regime has chosen to base its policy on the nationalization of the vital sectors of the economy, any failure of national companies in effect ruins the credibility of his revolution.

11550
CSO: 4400

CAPE VERDE

BRIEFS

DELAYED ELECTION RESULTS--In the nine inhabited islands of the Cape Verde archipelago, on 7 December, 125,462 voters out of 300,000 inhabitants were called upon to vote for the purpose of electing the 63 members of the first legislative assembly. The latter will succeed the constituent assembly which had proclaimed the independence of the former Portuguese colony on 5 July 1975. The candidacies were presented by PAIGC, the sole party, after three preliminary conferences established for the creation of lists within its basic organizations and local population assemblies. Taking into consideration the insular configuration of the country, there will no doubt be a long delay before the results of some of the electoral districts will reach Praia. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3403] 7993

COOPERATION WITH SPAIN--Agreement with Spain--An agreement for Hispano-Cape Verdian cooperation in connection with development was signed on 28 November in Madrid. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3403] 7993

CSO: 4400

GHANA

BRIEFS

OIL EXPLORATION--As reported in our MTM dated 5 December, p 3349, the Phillips Petroleum Company has discovered an interesting field off Half Hassini, and according to its vice president, Robert Haas, had drilled to a depth of more than 11,000 feet (3,350 m). Additional drilling will be carried out by the end of December to evaluate the importance of this deposit and the company plans to undertake further geological and geophysical studies next year. Still according to Haas, the company has already invested $60 million in Ghana and in addition will be investing approximately another 10 more million. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3407] 7993

CSO: 4400

GUINEA-BISSAU

POSSIBLE PORTUGUESE IMPLICATION IN COUP D'ETAT DISCUSSED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 8 Dec 80 pp 18-23

[Article by Augusta Conchiglia: "The New Regime--Between Ambiguity And Confusion"]

[Excerpts] The Council of the Revolution which was established by the coup d'etat on 14 November last consolidated its forces on the basis of Commander Joao Bernardo Vieria (alias Nino), who enjoys undeniable popularity, and it seems it has received the support of the population in Bissau.

Positions were to harden further after Praia demanded, although to no avail, the liberation of the PAIGC leaders arrested in Bissau: Luiz Cabral, the president, as well as Constantino Teixeira (Tchutchu), Umaru Djalo and Joao da Costa, ministers of interior, defense, and health, respectively. And above all after these latter--with the exception of the former health minister--were charged a few days later with ordering or committing "the massacre of 500 Guineans." The pot finally boiled over on 26 November when at a press conference, Manuel Saturnino, the present minister of interior and former ambassador to Moscow, with four other members of the Council of the Revolution present, announced the intention of the new regime to hold court trials of those it regarded as mainly responsible for the executions perpetrated in the past six years in Guinea-Bissau: ousted president Luiz Cabral, Jose Araujo, another PAIGC leader (a native of Cape Verde like Luiz Cabral), but also the secretary general of the PAIGC and president of Cape Verde, Aristides Pereira, the successor to Amilcar Cabral. Simultaneously, several other persons, including the former ministers of defense and the interior, as well as three general staff commanders of the FARP [People's Revolutionary Armed Forces], who were conferring in Praia with their Cape Verde colleagues at the time of the 14 November coup d'etat, were also charged with complicity in the business of the "massacres."

One might wonder why there was so much publicity--visits to the scenes of the crime were immediately organized for journalists and diplomats. It was as if there were an effort to tarnish forever the image of the country whose heroic liberation struggle had won it the esteem of all, or more precisely, an effort to cast opprobrium both on Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, two countries which had never ceased to be closely linked throughout the long battle waged against colonialism first, and then against the serious economic, social and cultural aftermath which followed domination by the Portuguese.

Without seeking to deny the execution of which some "opponents" may have been the victims, one can wonder why, in focusing the limelight on the cemeteries, an effort was made to create confusion, as if what was wanted was to have it forgotten that the majority of the bodies exhumed were those of people shot for participating in the "commando" actions of the colonial army.

(Within the framework of the "Africanization" of the war undertaken by the Portuguese, General Spinola incorporated in his army natives of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, the "commandos," some of whom fled to Senegal when independence was won.)

The charges made against the chief of state of Cape Verde by the Council of the Revolution in Bissau aroused the keenest indignation in political circles in Praia, where it is firmly believed that the high ranking Guinean officials were aware of the events in 1978.

The heterogenous nature of the present team in Bissau, where alongside former party leaders confirmed in their earlier ministerial functions there are cadres who, whereas they were chosen in the past for their technical competence and their experience in the field of diplomatic and economic relations with the West, now occupy key posts in the Council of the Revolution, hardly makes it possible for the time being to obtain any clear idea of what indeed the economic policy of the new regime might be.

However some reflections become necessary here and now. We note first of all that the analysis made of the economic situation inherited from the overthrown regime is entirely lacking in calm, and that if the errors and inadequacies noted in various sectors are automatically blamed on Luiz Cabral and some of his colleagues, there is an absence of any collective self-criticism. In order to correct the management of the people's stores, in which serious shortcomings, said to be the cause of certain shortages of goods of first necessity, are said to have existed, the Council of the Revolution appointed an investigation commission. But how can one fail to be surprised to find among these "investigators" one of the largest private retail merchants in Bissau who, not to speak of his rather cloudy personal history, is known for his hostility toward his state competitors?

Confused Circumstances

In fact, the 14 November coup d'etat created an ambiguous situation in which the new regime, while claiming to seek "correction" of the errors and deviations which occurred in the past, and to insure a leap forward for the revolution in Guinea, did not concern itself with the extensive commitments resulting from its relation with obscure--and less obscure--conservative forces. It was for this reason that the first targets of the new leaders were the Cape Verdians occupying party leadership posts. Nor could one fail to note the enthusiastic support given the Council of the Revolution--which did nothing to disengage itself from them--by known Guinean counterrevolutionary organizations, as well as the right-wing Portuguese press. Meanwhile, the exact circumstances of the development of the coup d'etat, in which two PAIGC leaders (Otto Schacht and Antonio Buscardini) were killed, while third, Vasco Cabral, also a party leader, was wounded, remain cloudy.

According to witnesses who were in Bissau, a member of the Council of the Revolution personally ordered the release of Barbosa, as well as two others who were arrested and sentenced at the same time as he was and for the same reasons, 2 years ago. In addition, a few hours after the coup d'etat, it will be recalled, Barbosa read a proclamation with a racist taint over national radio from Bissau, on behalf of the "14 November operational command," announcing the new "nationalist" path opening up for Guinea-Bissau. His voice, suddenly interrupted, was nonetheless heard long enough to provoke a cold sweat in many members of the PAIGC, particularly those living in the heart of the capital, where the comings and goings of armored vehicles, the muffled sounds of gunbursts and the first reports on the victims of the coup d'etat created a fear of a new operation, successful this time, on Barbosa's part. Also, when the radio carried a communique of the Council of the Revolution, read by the minister of foreign affairs, a number of listeners thought they saw there the result of a victorious counteroffensive by forces loyal to the PAIGC against that inveterate plotter, Raphael Barbosa. The next day, floods of telegrams and messages of congratulations were sent to the Council of the Revolution. They came in particular from the committees of the so-called Front For The Struggle For Guinea-Bissau Independence (FLING), and the Anti-Neo-Colonialist Patriotic Union of Guinea-Bissau (UPANG). This latter puppet organization, as if accidentally headed by Raphael Barbosa, expressed its joy at the liberation of its leader and railed against a number of Portuguese newspapers which had announced that this was "a coup d'etat by the most radical ring of the PAIGC."

Suspicious Friendships

The Organization For Free Africa (OAL), which includes the FUMO [Mozambique United Front], Chipenda's UNITA [National Union For The Total Independence of Angola], the UPANG and the Union of Independent And Democratic Cape Verdians (UCID), held meetings wherever it existed in order to study specific forms of support for the new regime in Bissau. At the same time, the UCID, although very little known among the masses of emigrants from Cape Verde who have settled in Europe, foresaw the possibility of proclaiming a government of Cape Verde in exile. And, for propaganda purposes, this organization caused a bomb to explode in the Cape Verde consulate in Rotterdam on 28 November, causing considerable physical damage.

When the news of the "discovery" of the cemeteries was announced, all these little counterrevolutionary groups intensified their agitation. The right wing in Portugal did not remain indifferent either. In the midst of the presidential electoral campaign in Lisbon, a conservative weekly went so far as to accuse General Ramalho Eanes of complicity in the Bissau "massacres." The Portuguese Prime Minister, Sa Carneiro, for his part, expressed the wish that economic cooperation with the new regime in Guinea-Bissau would develop. And a finger was pointed at personal friendships between members of the Council of the Revolution and Portuguese industrialists who, after having lined their pockets in colonial Africa, made no effort to conceal their intention of establishing a private bank and a chain of supermarkets one day in Bissau.

What is much more dangerous still is the fact that the same industrialists seem to maintain close relations with extreme rightist organizations or groups inspired by Spinola. Now these movements have not abandoned their intention of destroying the stability of the revolutionary regimes which have gained power in the former Portuguese colonies. To deal a blow to the alliance established among the five countries (Mozambique, Angola, Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde) by striking at the weakest link in the chain--this would seem to be their strategy. The progressive Portuguese press have not failed moreover to draw a parallel between the expulsion from Sao Tome and Principe a few weeks ago of two Portuguese diplomats accused of plotting attempts (weapons were in fact seized by the authorities) and the events in Bissau. The presence of Jorge Jardim in Gabon, where he has important economic interests, and whose proposal continues to be to tip Mozambique into the western camp, is of even greater concern to observers since in addition, Libreville has never concealed its designs on the islands of Sao Tome and Principe.

Has one stage in this conspiracy just ended? A factor contributing to an answer should be provided shortly when the Council of the Revolution in Bissau has defined its economic options. For the time being, the new leaders have given assurance that they will respect the commitments made by the preceding regime.

The former Portuguese colonies, in which the proposed establishment of joint economic institutions includes Guinea-Bissau as well, very obviously, and which are increasingly developing cooperation in all sectors, are most particularly concerned. In fact, they fear in particular the unpredictable consequences which might result from a schism in the PAIGC.

In the course of the confessions made by the assassins of Amilcar Cabral, we learned that one of the goals sought by the colonialists in attempting to eliminate this PAIGC leader was the exclusion of all natives of Cape Verde from the liberation movement, "for Portugal wanted to retain its control of the Cape Verde Islands, which represent a strategic base of capital importance for it and its NATO allies.

Whatever the case, isn't seeking to divide the two countries the best means of weakening them . . . and gaining control there?

5157
CSO: 4400

MADAGASCAR

DETAILS ON DISTURBANCES, ARRESTS GIVEN

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Dec 80 p 37

/Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "It Smells Like Something Is Burning"/

/Text/ There has been a student boycott of the university since the beginning of November. A friendly soccer match on 7 December between Kenya and Madagascar has degenerated into a riot, followed by the looting of several department stores in Antananarivo from 7 to 10 December. Outwardly there is no connection between these events than the fact that one non-striking professor was beaten up by his colleagues and some students and the fact that a merchant was attacked by his customers of another day.

Malaise

However, if on 9 December the authorities had announced the arrest of "40 looters" they had said nothing about the "preventive" measures that have nothing to do with "organized urban banditism" which is presumably responsible for the vandalism. For on 2 December--5 days after the cursed match--interrogations (and arrests) took place one after another in Antananarivo. University professors, among whom a former minister, were called to the police as they were suspected of being the instigators of the student boycott directed at a reform measure which was renewed every year since 1972.

Not announced in particular was the interrogation of the old nationalist Monja Jaona, leader of the MONIMA (Madagascar to the Malgaches). Picked up at Antananarivo as he stepped off the plane coming from Toliary (the southern capital), he was immediately put into protective custody: Monja Jaona was, it seemed, under threat of assassination. In actuality, he was invited to give a lecture at the university and everything must be made so that he could not give it. It was no doubt because being a clean and tough man--he had slammed the door in 1977 to the revolutionary coalition now in power--he had reportedly criticized very strongly the political and economic malaise now raging in Madagascar.

Economic malaise: queues starting at [illegible] pm in front of people's stores which do not open until the following day; drivers who get upset and fight one another in gas stations over a few liters of fuel--Iraqi oil being terribly scarce. In the meantime the prices climb up. A kilogram of rice, the basic food, costs 150 Madagascar francs each nowadays (equivalent to the same amount in CFA francs), or the triple of what it cost 2 years ago.

Nothing to Post

For Madagascar has not been safe from the international economic crisis. Only a few weeks ago, the price increases like the shortages were still imputed to mysterious "counterrevolutionaries, saboteurs of socialism and other agents of imperialism." Yet President Didier Ratsiraka announced then and there a rate of economic growth of 9 percent, a better rate than even Japan's. But since August 1979 the Central Bank of Madagascar (BCM) has not posted the figure of currency reserves--"the information has simply not been available." Rather it is because there is nothing left to post. The debts which the BCM holds over the state amounted to 131 billion Madagascar francs at the end of 1979. And the budget deficit of 1981 is expected to be borne by the same bank.

Frustrations

The approach of the festivities at the end of 1980--and of the fifth anniversary of the revolution--has exacerbated the frustrations, particularly in the big cities where the leaflets--for lack of press freedom--daily criticize the corruption erected into socialist virtue at the head of the state. Members of the Supreme Council of the Revolution, ministers of the revolutionary government, and great agents of the state are denounced for their "affairism."

Then the political malaise. Within the National Front for the Defense of the Revolution (which is a grouping of the only five legal parties) itself there is mistrust which increases proportionally to the rhythm of the race towards the 1982 legislative and presidential elections. Inside the very party of Didier Ratsiraka, the AREMA (Avant-Garde Revolutionnaire Malgâche, Revolutionary Malgache Vanguard), the revolutionaries have split into left and... right. In the very bosom of the government there rule suspicion and doubt.

1751
CSO: 4400

PLANNING MINISTER ON GOALS OF NEXT 5-YEAR PLAN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3155

[Report on statement by Mali Planning Minister Ahmed Mohamed Ag Hamani prior to 4 November start of a tour of the country--date and place not specified]

[Text] On 4 November, Mali Planning Minister Ahmed Mohamed Ag Hamani started on extensive travels throughout Mali within the framework of preparation of the next 5-year plan for economic and social development 1981-1985. This tour will allow Mr Ag Hamani to kick off the work of the regional planning committees.

As recently indicated by the planning minister, the long range goals of the 5-year plan are "to build a planned and independent natural economy, that is, an economy in which vulnerability to external factors and climate would be reduced to the minimum, thus establishing secure, reliable and improved sources of income for the entire population.

"The medium range goals must continue to reach toward the long range goals. In our next development plan they will particularly be aimed at the following: control of subterranean and surface waters, food self-sufficiency, consolidation of livestock reconstitution efforts, restoration of basic equilibriums, and improvement of the state of social well-being of the people.

"From the point of view of our development strategy, a clear evolution is to be seen in comparison with the preceding plan. At this level, the following major directions can be retained: a basic integrated development and a cleansing of the environment.

"The basic integrated development is a new approach which will be based on the people's will, through their village structures, and their need to take control of their future.

"The cleansing of the environment is an imperative which from now on will impose itself upon us as the sine qua non condition of our development. The Malian economy can be cured. Until this body is well again, it is obvious that every effort undertaken toward development will come to naught."

"Mali still has hydroagricultural and human potential," added the minister, "capable of returning it to the position which in the past made it the breadbasket of West

Africa. It is on the basis of these findings that our next plan is aimed not only at reaching food self-sufficiency, but even at producing exportable surpluses."

9627
CSO: 4400

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MALI

BRIEFS

CANADIAN POTABLE WATER ASSISTANCE--The ACDI (Canadian Agency for International Development) and Mali announced the official opening of building sites for the supply of drinking water for the towns of Dire, Djenne and Douentza. This project amounting to 1,295 million Malian francs is listed in the framework of the agreement between the Malian and Canadian governments for the purpose of reinforcing the services of the general directorate of hydraulics and energy to supply drinking water to the urban population in the northern regions of Mali. In addition the general directorate for hydraulics and energy will be equipped with a laboratory for water analysis. This project, which will cost 63 million Malian francs will be carried out by the SNTP (National Company for Public Works). It also includes the supply of equipment for product analyses to insure the quality of the water destined for human consumption. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 pp 3403-3404] 7993

FOODSTUFFS PRICE INCREASE--Retail prices of millet and rice, cereals of which the greatest amount is consumed in Mali, increased by about 30 percent. According to a communique from the Malian Ministry of Finance and Commerce, the price of millet rose from 77 to 85 Malian francs per kilo, and rice from 177.50 to 200 Malian francs. The price of lump sugar per kilo increased from 500 to 650 Malian francs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3404] 7993

USSR-ASSISTED AIRPORT--A new military airport constructed with Soviet assistance was officially inaugurated on 27 November in Mopti (600 km north east of Bamako). The airport was inaugurated by Lt Col Abdoulaye Ouologuem, acting chief of staff for land forces and representing the Malian minister of defense, and soviet Gen Malinovski. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3404] 7993

CSO: 4400

NIGERIA

BRIEFS

NEXT FAIR NOVEMBER 1981--The Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry has announced that an international fair would be held on 8-14 November 1981 in the vast fairground complex which has been used only once before for such an event, i.e. in 1977 when it was built; since then, the complex has been hardly used at all. Interested British enterprises have already been invited to contact the Overseas Exhibition Services (11, Manchester Square, London W1). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEESN in French 28 Nov 80 p 3165] 9294

FOURTH PETROLEUM REFINERY PROJECT--According to BUSINESS TIMES of 11 November, the fourth Nigerian petroleum refinery, to be built under the next national development plan at Port-Harcourt, not far from the first one, would have a daily production capacity of 200,000 barrels. It would thus be considerably larger than the first three. However, it is known that the Port-Harcourt refinery, which has been in operation for a long time, will be enlarged; its present capacity does not exceed 60,000 barrels per day. In addition, according to BUSINESS TIMES, the other two refineries at Warri and Kaduna, are also going to be enlarged to increase their capacities to 100,000 and 120,000 barrels per day. The Lagos economic and financial weekly recalls that Nigeria is far from covering its own refined products requirements and still fears future shortages. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Dec 80 p 3347] 9294

COOPERATION WITH EAST GERMANY--The conversations on bilateral economic cooperation which the GDR minister of Foreign Affairs was to start on 28 November in Lagos with the Nigerian authorities have been postponed to 15 January 1981. The federal minister of Economic Planning, Mrs Adenike Oyagbola is said to have asked for this postponement. She is reported to have said that her department is now too busy with the preparation of the fourth national development plan for 1980-1985--to be started on 1 January--and is not now in a position to carry out in-depth discussions on the future cooperation between her country and the GDR. Let us recall that, in the past, the two countries have signed a series of cooperation agreements covering culture (1979), science and technology and civilian aviation (1977). The first commercial agreement was signed in 1974. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Dec 80 p 3348] 9294

REUTER BACK IN COUNTRY--The REUTER agency which had been ordered by the former military government to leave Nigeria following the assassination of Gen Murtala Muhammad in 1976, has been authorized by the civilian government of President Shehu Shagari to return to Nigeria. The agency resident correspondent in Lagos is Mr John Rogers who is 37. Before being appointed to Nigeria, he had a post in Canada. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3408] 9294

GASOLINE PRICES--According to the magazine PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, Nigeria has decided to increase the price for its crude oil and to reduce its deliveries starting next 1 January. Therefore, all contracts now in force would be revised. The specialized magazine specifies that a premium of $2 to $2.50 per barrel will be added to the official price and that deliveries will be limited to 20-30 thousand barrels per day and per company. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 p 3483] 9292

CSO: 4400

TOGO

LOAN AGREEMENTS SIGNED WITH ECONOMIC COOPERATION FUND

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3164

[Report on three loan agreements signed with the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation--CCCE--in Lome on 17 November]

[Excerpt] Mr Tete Tevi-Benissan, Togolese economy and finance minister, on 17 November signed three loan agreements for a total of 2.7 billion CFA francs with Mr Jacques Albugnes, director of the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation, in Lome.

The first loan, in the amount of 1.1 billion CFA francs, is granted to partially finance the second phase of the project to modernize and expand Lome's telephone system. This project, at an overall cost of 2.386 billion CFA francs, is being financed jointly with the West African Development Bank (WADB). This loan follows the 700-million CFA franc loan granted to Togo in 1977 by the Central Fund to set up Lome's telephone exchange.

The second loan, in the amount of 1.2 billion CFA francs, is granted to insure the partial financing of two cotton ginning plants at Lama-Kara and Notse so as to allow the Togolese Cotton Company (SOTOCO) to develop cotton production.

The third loan, in the amount of 400 million CFA francs, is granted to the Republic of Togo to finance the Lome airport installations so as to make it accessible to heavy cargo planes.

9627
CSO: 4400

ZIMBABWE

FOREIGN PRESS CAMPAIGN SLANDERING NATION ALLEGED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 10 Nov 80 pp 34-35

[Article by Tania Vasconcelos: "Africa of the Nine"--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] Zimbabwe is the object of a campaign of denigration, especially in Great Britain and Western Europe. It is this observation which caused the Harare government to reestablish the former system of temporary residence permits for press correspondents last October. /"Certain foreign journalists,"/ explained the minister of information, N. Shamuyarura, /"seek to create sensationalism by exploiting unfounded stories, without carying about truth or the repercussions which these news reports run the risk of having on our country."/ South Africa is the main offender in this area. The journalists of Pretoria have, in fact, since the victory of the Popular Front, created the notion that civil war was about to break out. And it is this thesis that it is trying to support by placing emphasis on the present economic difficulties and painting an especially gloomy picture of the situation: in the countryside where banditry reportedly rages and in industrial concerns reportedly paralyzed by the demands of African workers. Likewise, they stress the disputes which can pit, the parties against the government, or the departure of whites /"disappointed with the lack of safety and prospects for normalization."/

Certainly there is no lack of difficulties. But the objective of Zimbabwe's detractors is not to depict reality. What they seek to question is the very capacity of the new leaders to master the situation. Thus the insistence on highlighting the contradictions of the moment and raising false problems, around themes such as /"socialism or pragmatism"/, /"calls for investments and the risks of nationalizations"/, etc. Zimbabwe would be synonymous, according to them, with instability, a chaotic economic situation, crimes of a racial character. All this propaganda obviously is not harmless. Even less so since there are a number of African countries which, in spite of a much more consolidated independence, are protected neither from terrorism nor from economic difficulty.

Even less so and especially since Zimbabwe is in a very special situation. A rebel and openly racist colony, but well organized and developed to the point of being in a position to face economic sanctions--or, more exactly, to find subterfuges for evading them--the former Rhodesia was in possession of a prosperous agriculture and advanced industry which, a rare case in Africa, contributed more than 20 percent of the GNP and guaranteed not only self-sufficiency but also important exports (meat, tobacco, sugar, various ores). And, if one believes the statistics recently published in Harare and which deal with the manner in which the Smith regime was able to circumvent the sanctions, the Rhodesian economy remained solid even during the last phase of the war of liberation. That is to say that the surrender, in 1978, of the rebels to the British throne, was certainly due essentially to the victory of the armed struggle of the Patriotic Front of Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. But now there exists an unwillingness to believe in the fact that a government which resulted from elections in which the insurgents obtained a huge consensus of the black population which formerly was completely muzzled is capable of remedying the consequences of the war and insuring economic recovery. And, still less, of maintaining, without risk of collapse and disorganization, the rate of development of the preceding 18 years. It's because the success of an independent Zimbabwe would likely place in a difficult position the proponents of the thesis of /"technical and cultural"/ inequality between the colonizers and the colonized. And it is, in the end, all offensive propaganda of the South African system, which boasts of, as one knows only too well, impressive industrial and military power which would collapse.

In Zimbabwe--where, what seems unbelievable to Pretoria, namely the taking of power by the majority, actually happened on April 18, 1980--certain mass media cling desperately to everything that can nurture this racist thesis: /"'They' cannot manage it all by themselves..."/

That is why everything is interpreted in a biased way, including the urgent need to have recourse to foreign aid, nonetheless perfectly understandable for a country which is not only coming out of a long war but has to put an end to a system of flagrant social injustice.

Since independence, Prime Minister Mugabe has not stopped repeating that economic recovery is not possible without substantial foreign aid, and Zimbabwean leaders have been exerting every effort to obtain this assistance. During his trip to the United States, at the end of last August, on the occasion of his country's admission as 153rd member of the United Nations, Robert Mugabe calculated at 350 million dollars just the cost of reconstructing roads, schools and hospitals destroyed during the war. He also indicated that 5 billion dollars would be necessary for economic reconstruction works over the next 5 years. But these appeals to the Carter administration and the committee of the American Congress with which Robert Mugabe held talks, have thus far remained unanswered. For the present, Washington has held fast to the aid granted at the time of independence, namely, 50 million dollars spread out over 2 years. Kissinger, however, it is recalled, had promised to be a great deal more generous. He had anticipated--without a doubt because he did not believe in the development of the process toward independence and the assumption of power by the majority--a billion dollars in aid for the future Zimbabwe. That was, in his opinion, the minimum cost of economic reconstruction, and U.S. aid, he said, was necessary if one did not want the country to fall into the sphere /"of Soviet influence"/. These are the same arguments that Lord Soames, former British high commissioner in Rhodesia during the transition to independence period, uses now. /"It would be tragic,"/ he says, /"if Mugabe were to change policy as a result of the West's lack of interest with respect to his country."/ Besides we can wonder what will come of these declarations, which represent at the very least, a strange and not very honorable concept of aid to a country in difficulty. The more so since the policy of ZANU's leader is dictated more by objective conditions than the choice of a "camp."

French Trumps

It is certainly Westerners who, avoiding the economic sanctions with the help of Pretoria, contributed, for example, to the development of the industrial park of Rhodesia and were importing the products of the racist state. It is difficult to see, consequently, to whom else the government of independent Zimbabwe could turn to renew its equipment, modernize its infrastructures or obtain financing. Inviting French industrialists to invest in Zimbabwe, the French Foreign Trade Ministry's survey recalled, last March, that /"in the race for the Zimbabwean market, the French hold some trump cards. Coyne and Belier participated in the realization of the Kariba dam and several irrigation projects in the southwestern part of the country. French cars are visible everywhere in Zimbabwe. France,"/ concluded the survey, /" enjoys a high popularity rating among those positions of economic responsibility, which neither the United Kingdom nor the United States any longer enjoy"/.

If that was true on the eve of independence, things have without a doubt changed since. Prime Minister Mugabe has declared himself especially disappointed by the French posture which, on the one hand, granted "insignificant" aid to the new State and which, on the other, most energetically opposed Zimbabwe's entry into the EEC-ACP, of which the new State became, despite all, the 60th member last October 9th. In order to justify its attitude, the French Government posed especially, as the protector of its African partners, pointing out that products of the latter would be competitive with those which Zimbabwe could offer to the European market. In reality, the reason for the weak interest shown by Paris in the Mugabe regime is to be found in the excellence of France's friendly and economic relations with Pretoria. For, taking into account only the Namibian problem, it is clear that a rapid rectification of the new situation in Zimbabwe would have "fearsome" repercussions on the settlement of this burning question. However, the absence of initiative on the part of the Paris government has not prevented certain French entrepreneurs and businessmen from becoming interested in a market as important as that of Zimbabwe, in which, moreover, Italians and West Germans are already doing business. At the opening, last September 1st, of a conference gathering together 1,000 businessmen from Zimbabwe and the principal Western nations, Robert Mugabe criticized the reluctance of foreign powers to aid his country whose important mining and agricultural riches he stressed. At the same time, the prime minister indicated that possible investors should take account of the needs of the Zimbabwean people as well as of the imperative need for a rapid rise in the standard of living of the most disadvantaged strata. Corroborating that only the areas of energy and certain strategic industries, such as steel, will of necessity call for state participation, Robert Mugabe made no allusion to future nationalization. He recalled, on the other hand, that foreign partners should reinvest a substantial percentage of their profits in the country.

Six months after independence, the foreign contribution remains very far short of that expected. Great Britain, honoring promises which date back to Lancaster House, should grant without delay a loan of 20 million pounds under very favorable conditions. It would be the first payment of a total of 75 million pounds to be granted over a 3-year period and which would allow for the purchase of 1.1 million hectares of European farms on which about 20,000 black families could be installed. Still this would be only a drop in the bucket in comparison to the immense needs of the rural African population, formerly chased from their lands, for cultivable land.

Certainly, it is quite evident that the Mugabe government's reform program will not depend solely on the good will of Western governments. But it is nonetheless true that a too prolonged delay in implementing this program or more radical measures against the White community, would run the risk of worsening the situation and, in the final analysis, of forcing the African workers into making additional sacrifices.

A Development...

Zimbabwe's entry into the EEC-ACP--which will insure the sale to Europe of 8,100 tons of meat, as well as, for the 1982-83 campaign, of 25,000 tons of sugar (without counting the tobacco and minerals)--is already a significant achievement. Note also that the admission of former Rhodesia into the regional economic community is under way. Relations with Mozambique, which has reopened its ports and railroads to Zimbabwean commerce, are excellent, and frequent meetings between Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and President Samora Machel--the latest at the end of October--insure a permanent coordination in the areas of economic cooperation and security. It is a question, especially, of agreeing on the actions to be taken to eliminate Mozambican counterrevolutionary elements operating in the border zones, from Malawi and South Africa. Finally, as a result of the pledge made at last April's Summit meeting in Lusaka of the nine countries of southern Africa to /"reduce their economic dependence on South Africa"/, a meeting is to be held in Maputo on 27-28 November. Those who give aid to the nine independent states, as well as the member-states of the European Economic Community, will participate in it.

This is a major development. For, the solidarity of the nine independent states of southern Africa can contribute effectively in overcoming the reservations of the Western countries and force them to assume their responsibilities.

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